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Risk Aversion 
Risk aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary 
payoffs (Pratt, 1964). However, one can also consider risk aversion when the outcomes 
of risky lotteries may not be measurable in monetary terms. For example, people can be 
risk averse or risk prone when driving their car, choosing a medical treatment, selecting 
a holiday destination, deciding to marry or to divorce etc. This paper extends the notion 
of risk aversion to decision problems where outcomes (consequences) may not be 
measurable in monetary terms. Epstein (1999) defines uncertainty aversion when the 
outcome set is arbitrary rather than Euclidean but people have a unique preference 
ordering over uncertain alternatives. 
Numerous empirical studies show that people generally have fuzzy preferences 
over lotteries, i.e. they choose in a probabilistic manner (e.g. Camerer, 1989; Hey and 
Orme, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1998). Therefore, this paper also extends the notion 
of risk aversion to allow for the possibility of fuzzy preferences. Hilton (1989) and 
Wilcox (2008) define risk aversion in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs 
when people choose probabilistically between lotteries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 defines comparative risk aversion 
in the context of an arbitrary outcome set. Section 2 considers the implications of this 
definition for neoclassical expected utility theory. Section 3 extends the notion of risk 
aversion to a more general setup where people have fuzzy preferences over lotteries. 
Section 4 analyses risk aversion within two well-known models of probabilistic choice 
(a constant error/tremble model and a strong utility model). Section 5 defines absolute 
risk aversion and relative riskiness of lotteries. Section 6 concludes. 
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1. Comparative Risk Aversion 
Let X be a finite nonempty set of outcomes (consequences). We will treat X as 
an arbitrary abstract set so that an element x∈X can be a monetary payoff, a consumption 
bundle, a health state, marriage or divorce, birth of a child, the afterlife etc. A lottery 
L:X→[0,1] is a probability distribution on X, i.e. it delivers an outcome x∈X with a 
probability L(x) ∈ [0,1] and ∑x∈X L(x)=1. A degenerate lottery that yields one outcome 
x∈X with probability one is denoted by (x,1). The set of all lotteries is denoted by ℒ. 
In this and the next section we consider a “traditional” decision maker who has 
a unique binary preference relation  on ℒ. As customary, we will use the sign  to 
denote the asymmetric component of , and the sign ~ to denote the symmetric 
component of . We will consider two individuals: an individual ♀ characterized by a 
preference relation ♀ and an individual ♂ characterized by a preference relation ♂. 
Definition 1 An individual ♀ is unambiguously more risk averse than an 
individual ♂ if (x,1)♂L implies (x,1)♀L for all x∈X and all L∈ℒ and there exists at least 
one degenerate lottery (x,1)∈ℒ and one lottery L∈ℒ such that (x,1) ~♂ L and (x,1) ♀ L. 
According to Definition 1, a more risk averse individual weakly prefers a 
degenerate lottery over another lottery whenever a less risk averse individual does so as 
well. This definition of the more-risk-averse-than relation between individuals is very 
general. Specifically, we do not require that lottery outcomes are measurable in real 
numbers. We also do not require that individual preferences over lotteries are 
represented by a specific decision theory (e.g. expected utility theory). 
Definition 1 immediately implies the following result. If an individual ♀ is 
more risk averse than an individual ♂, or vice versa, then (x,1) ♀ (y,1) if and only if 
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(x,1) ♂ (y,1) for all x,y∈X. This implication of our definition is quite intuitive. We can 
unambiguously rank two individuals in terms of their risk preferences only if they have 
identical preferences over riskless alternatives (degenerate lotteries). If the two 
individuals do not have the same preferences in choice under certainty, one of them may 
choose a specific degenerate lottery because it is her most preferred alternative and not 
because she is averse to risk. Therefore, to have a meaningful concept of comparative 
risk aversion, we need to consider individuals with identical preferences over the set of 
riskless consequences. 
2. Risk Aversion in Expected Utility Theory 
Let us now apply the concept of comparative risk aversion in the context of 
expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In expected utility theory 
there exists an utility function u:X→ that is unique up to a positive linear 
transformation, such that  
(1) S  R   if and only if   ∑x∈X S(x)u(x) ≥ ∑x∈X R(x)u(x), 
for any two lotteries S, R ∈ ℒ. Formula (1) simply states that a lottery S is weakly 
preferred over a lottery R if and only if the expected utility of S is greater than or equal 
to the expected utility of R.  
As we already discussed above, for comparing risk aversion across individuals 
we need to consider people with identical preferences over the set of riskless outcomes. 
We will say that two individuals ♀ and ♂ have ordinally equivalent utility functions 
when u♀(x)≥u♀(y) if and only if u♂(x)≥u♂(y) for any two outcomes x, y ∈ X. 
Proposition 1 An expected utility maximizer ♀ with utility function u♀:X→ 
is more risk averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂ with ordinally equivalent 
utility function u♂:X→ if and only if   
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(2) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u y u x u y u x
u z u y u z u y
− −≥− −
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
, 
for any x, y, z ∈ X such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z) and there exists at least one triple of 
outcomes {x, y, z} ⊂ X for which inequality (2) holds with strict inequality. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix.  
Proposition 1 can be interpreted in the following way. We can use an index 
I♀(x, y, z)≡(u♀(y)-u♀(x))/(u♀(z)-u♀(y)) to measure the risk aversion of an expected utility 
maximizer ♀ in the context of outcomes x, y, z ∈ X such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z). 
Similar to the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for lotteries over 
monetary payoffs, the index I♀(x, y, z) captures only local risk aversion. Therefore, for 
an expected utility maximizer ♀ to be unambiguously more risk averse than an expected 
utility maximizer ♂, we need to have I♀(x, y, z) ≥ I♂(x, y, z) for all triples of outcomes 
{x, y, z} ⊂ X such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z). Note that an index I♀(x, y, z) is an adequate 
measure of local risk aversion because it is invariant to positive linear transformations 
of the utility function u♀:X→. 
 
Figure 1 An expected utility maximizer ♀ is more risk averse than an expected 
utility maximizer ♂: illustration in the probability triangle 
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Proposition 1 can be conveniently illustrated inside the probability triangle 
(e.g. Machina, 1982). When the outcome set X has only three elements (X={x, y, z}), the 
set of all lotteries ℒ can be represented as a rectangular triangle. By convention, the 
probability of the outcome that yields the lowest utility (x) is shown on the horizontal 
axis and the probability of the outcome that yields the highest utility (z) is shown on the 
vertical axis. Indifference curves inside the probability triangle represent the set of all 
lotteries that yield the same expected utility. Specifically, indifference curves of an 
expected utility maximizer with utility function u(.) are straight parallel lines with a 
positive slope (u(y)-u(x))/(u(z)-u(y)). Thus, if an expected utility maximizer ♀ is more 
risk averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂, the indifference curves of individual 
♀ have a greater slope inside the probability triangle (indifference curves are steeper). 
3. Probabilistic Risk Aversion 
Numerous experimental studies find that binary choice under risk is generally 
probabilistic in nature (e.g. Camerer, 1989; Hey and Orme, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 
1998). In this section we will extend Definition 1 to a more general setup where people 
may choose in a probabilistic manner. There are several alternative explanations why 
people make inconsistent choices under risk when decision problems are repeated 
within a short period of time (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1995). For example, people may 
have multiple preference relations on ℒ or they may make random errors.  
We will now assume that the primitive of choice is a binary choice probability 
function P:ℒ¯ℒ→[0,1], which is also known as a fuzzy preference relation (e.g. 
Zimmerman et al., 1984). The notation P(S,R) represents the probability that an 
individual chooses lottery S ∈ ℒ over lottery R ∈ ℒ in a direct binary choice. For any 
two lotteries S, R ∈ ℒ, S ≠ R, the probability P(S,R) is observable from the relative 
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frequency with which an individual chooses S when asked to choose repeatedly between 
S and R. We will consider two individuals: an individual ♀ characterized by a binary 
choice probability function P♀(.,.) and an individual ♂ characterized by a binary choice 
probability function P♂(.,.).  
Definition 1a An individual ♀ is probabilistically more risk averse than an 
individual ♂ if P♀((x,1),L)≥P♂((x,1),L) for all x∈X and all L∈ℒ and there exists at least 
one degenerate lottery (x,1)∈ℒ and one lottery L∈ℒ such that P♀((x,1),L)>P♂((x,1),L). 
According to Definition 1a, a more risk averse individual is always at least as 
likely to choose a degenerate lottery over a risky lottery as a less risk averse individual. 
This definition of the more-risk-averse-than relation between individuals is very general. 
As before, we do not restrict lottery outcomes to be measurable in real numbers. We 
also do not require that fuzzy preferences over lotteries are represented by a specific 
model of probabilistic choice. Thus, we can apply Definition 1a to very distinct models 
of probabilistic choice, e.g. when people have multiple preference relations on ℒ 
(Loomes and Sugden, 1995) or when people have a unique preference relation on ℒ but 
they make random errors (Fechner, 1860; Hey and Orme, 1994; Blavatskyy, 2007). 
If lottery L in Definition 1a is another degenerate lottery (y,1), y∈X, then we 
arrive at the following result. If an individual ♀ is more risk averse than an individual 
♂, or vice versa, then P♀((x,1), (y,1)) = P♂((x,1), (y,1)) for all x,y∈X. In other words, we 
can unambiguously rank two individuals in terms of their risk attitudes only if they 
choose in identical manner between riskless alternatives (degenerate lotteries). If this is 
not the case, heterogeneous risk attitudes are confounded with heterogonous tastes over 
riskless outcomes and we cannot make a clear comparison of individuals in terms or 
relative risk aversion. 
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4. Risk Aversion in Models of Probabilistic Choice 
In this section we consider the implications of Definition 1a for several well-
known models of probabilistic choice. Arguably, the simplest model of probabilistic 
choice is the constant error/tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994). In this model, 
an individual has a unique preference relation on ℒ but she does not always choose the 
preferred lottery. With a constant probability τ∈[0,1] a tremble occurs and the individual 
chooses the less preferred lottery. Specifically, in a constant error/tremble model there 
exists an utility function u:X→ that is unique up to a linear transformation, such that  
(3) P(S,R) = 0.5 + (0.5 – τ) sign( ∑x∈X S(x)u(x) – ∑x∈X R(x)u(x) ), 
for any two lotteries S, R∈ℒ and a probability τ∈[0,1]. Formula (3) states that a lottery S 
is chosen over a lottery R with probability 1-τ if the expected utility of S is greater than 
the expected utility of R; with probability 0.5—if the expected utilities of lotteries S and 
R are exactly equal; and with probability τ—if the expected utility of S is less than the 
expected utility of R. The result of Proposition 1 can be extended to a constant 
error/tremble model of probabilistic choice. 
Proposition 2 If individual choices are represented by a constant error/tremble 
model (3) then an individual ♀ with utility function u♀:X→ and the probability of a 
tremble τ♀ is more risk averse than an individual ♂ with ordinally equivalent utility 
function u♂:X→ and the probability of a tremble τ♂ = τ♀ if and only if   
(4) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u y u x u y u x
u z u y u z u y
− −≥− −
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
, 
for any x, y, z ∈ X such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z) and there exists at least one triple of 
outcomes {x, y, z} ⊂ X for which inequality (2) holds with strict inequality. 
Proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. 
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Not all models of probabilistic choice allow for an unambiguous ranking of 
individuals in terms of their risk preferences. For example, consider a strong utility 
model (e.g. Luce and Suppes, 1965). In a strong utility model there exists an utility 
function u:X→ that is unique up to a positive linear transformation, and a strictly 
increasing function :→[0,1], which satisfies (v)+(-v)=1 for all v∈, such that  
(5) P(S,R) =  ( ∑x∈X S(x)u(x) – ∑x∈X R(x)u(x) )  
for any two lotteries S, R∈ℒ. If the function (.) is the cumulative distribution function 
of a normal distribution with zero mean and constant standard deviation, model (5) 
becomes the Fechner model of random errors (Fechner, 1860; Hey and Orme, 1994). If 
the function (.) is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution: 
(v)=1/(1+exp(-λv)), where λ>0 is constant, model (5) becomes the Luce choice model 
(Luce, 1959). Blavatskyy (2008) provides axiomatic characterization of model (5). 
Proposition 3 If individual choices are represented by a strong utility model 
(5) then it is impossible to find two individuals such that one of them is probabilistically 
more risk averse than the other. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
In a recent study, Wilcox (2008) discusses the failure of a strong utility model 
to rank individuals in terms of their risk preferences (in the context of lotteries over 
monetary outcomes). 
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5. Absolute Risk Aversion and Relative Riskiness 
So far we considered only comparative risk aversion. To measure absolute risk 
aversion, we need to fix one binary choice probability function PRN : ℒ¯ℒ → [0,1]. An 
individual is called risk neutral if she has the binary choice probability function PRN(.,.). 
An individual is called risk averse if she is more risk averse (according to Definition 1a) 
than the risk neutral individual. Similarly, an individual is called risk seeking or risk 
loving if the risk neutral individual is more risk averse than this individual. Notice that 
the concept of absolute risk aversion depends on an ad hoc selection of a risk neutral 
binary choice probability function PRN(.,.). This is similar to our temperature 
measurement that also requires an ad hoc selection of zero temperature (e.g. the triple 
point of water in the Celsius scale or absolute zero in the Kelvin scale). 
The concept of comparative risk aversion can be also used to define the 
relative riskiness of lotteries. In a sense, we are now looking at the other side of a coin. 
We ask the question: when is one lottery riskier than the other so that more risk averse 
people dislike it? For expositional clarity, let us first define relative riskiness when 
people have a unique rational preference relation  on the set of lotteries ℒ.  
One way to define relative riskiness is the following. A lottery R ∈ ℒ is riskier 
than a lottery S ∈ ℒ if S ♂ R implies S ♀ R for any two individuals ♀ and ♂ such that 
♀ is more risk averse than ♂, and S ♂ R implies S ♀ R for at least one such pair of 
individuals. Aumann and Serrano (2007) use a similar definition of relative riskiness in 
the context of lotteries over monetary outcomes. 
However, there may exist two lotteries S, R ∈ ℒ such that every individual 
strictly prefers S over R (in this case we say that lottery S dominates lottery R). For such 
pair of lotteries, a more risk averse individual would always strictly prefer S over R. 
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However, this strong preference is not related to the relative riskiness of the two 
lotteries. It simply reflects the fact that S is relatively better than R. To distinguish 
between relative riskiness and relative attractiveness of lotteries, we use the following 
definition.  
Definition 2 A lottery R ∈ ℒ is riskier than a lottery S ∈ ℒ if S ≿♂ R implies    
S ♀ R for any two individuals ♀ and ♂ such that ♀ is more risk averse than ♂, and 
there exists at least one such pair of individuals for whom we have S ~♂ R and S ♀ R. 
Definition 2 is more general than the traditional definitions of relative riskiness 
in terms of second-order stochastic dominance or mean-preserving spreads (Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1970). First of all, Definition 2 does not require lottery outcomes to be 
measurable in real numbers. Second, traditional definitions of relative riskiness are 
equivalent to Definition 2 with an additional restriction that an individual ♂ is risk-
neutral. Thus, the traditional definitions of relative riskiness apply only to a subset of 
lotteries ℒ´ ⊂ ℒ such that for any S, R ∈ ℒ´ we have S ~RN R (when lottery outcomes are 
monetary, this condition simply means that S and R have the same expected value). In 
contrast, Definition 2 imposes a partial ordering in terms of relative riskiness on a 
significantly larger set of lotteries. 
Definition 2 defines riskiness as the attribute of lotteries that risk averse people 
dislike. If we make additional assumptions about individual preferences over lotteries, 
we can define riskiness in terms of objective characteristics of lotteries without referring 
to subjective preferences. For example, let us consider individual preferences that are 
represented by expected utility theory. As we already discussed above, comparative risk 
aversion is well-defined under expected utility theory only if people have ordinally 
equivalent utility functions.  
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Proposition 4 For a group of expected utility maximizers that have utility 
functions ordinally equivalent to a function u:X→, a lottery R∈ℒ is riskier than another 
lottery S ∈ ℒ if there exists an outcome y ∈ X such that ∑x∈X | u(x)≤v S(x) ≤ ∑x∈X | u(x)≤v R(x) 
for any v < u(y) and ∑x∈X | u(x)≤w S(x) ≥ ∑x∈X | u(x)≤w R(x) for any w > u(y) and there exists at 
least one v < u(y) and one w > u(y) such that both inequalities hold as strict inequalities. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 can be conveniently illustrated inside the probability triangle 
when the outcome set is X={x, y, z}. As it is conventional, we plot the probability of the 
outcome x (z) that yields the lowest (highest) utility on the horizontal (vertical) axis. 
Figure 2 shows the set {R∈ℒ|R(x)>L(x),R(z)>L(z)} of all lotteries that are riskier than an 
arbitrary selected lottery L and the set of all lotteries {S∈ℒ|S(x)<L(x),S(z)<L(z)} that are 
less risky than L. Figure 2 adheres to informal usage of the concept of relative riskiness. 
Many studies refer to the lotteries located in the north-eastern direction as “riskier” and 
to the lotteries located in the south-western direction—as “safer” but do not provide a 
formal definition of relative riskiness (e.g. Camerer, 1989; Loomes and Sugden, 1998). 
 
Figure 2 The set of all lotteries that are riskier than lottery L and the set of all 
lotteries that are less risky than lottery L: illustration in the probability triangle 
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We can extend Definition 2 to a more general setup where people have fuzzy 
preferences captured by a binary choice probability function P:ℒ¯ℒ → [0,1]. 
Definition 2a A lottery R∈ℒ is riskier than a lottery S∈ℒ if P♀(S,R)≥P♂(S,R) 
for any two individuals ♀ and ♂ such that ♀ is more risk averse than ♂, and there exists 
at least one such pair of individuals for whom we have P♀(S,R)>P♂(S,R). 
6. Conclusion  
Risk aversion is a fundamental concept in many fields of economics. However, 
it is traditionally defined only in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This 
paper extends the definition of risk aversion to a more general setup where lottery 
outcomes are not necessarily measurable in real numbers and people do not necessarily 
have a unique preference relation over risky lotteries, i.e. they may choose in a 
probabilistic manner.  
We show that in neoclassical expected utility theory risk aversion can be 
captured by a simple index of local risk aversion (the slope of indifference curves inside 
the “local” probability triangle). The same result holds for a constant error/ tremble 
model of probabilistic choice. However, not all models of probabilistic choice allow for 
an unambiguous ranking of individuals in terms of their risk preferences. In particular, 
we prove an impossibility theorem for a strong utility model of probabilistic choice 
(which includes the Fechner model and the Luce choice model as special cases).  
Finally, we show that the definition of comparative risk aversion can be used 
to define a related concept of the relative riskiness of lotteries. Our proposed definition 
of relative riskiness generalizes traditional definitions (second-order stochastic 
dominance, mean preserving spreads) to a larger class of lotteries (that may differ in 
expected value or may yield non-monetary payoffs). The proposed definition adheres to 
the informal usage of the concept of relative riskiness in the literature. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Let us first prove the necessity of condition (2). If an individual ♀ is more risk 
averse than an individual ♂ then there exists at least one triple of outcomes {x, y, z}⊂X 
such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z). Otherwise, an utility function u♀:X→ maps all 
outcomes to only one or two real numbers and an ordinally equivalent utility function 
u♂:X→ does the same. Hence, utility function u♂:X→ is a linear transformation of 
utility function u♀:X→ and both individuals have the same binary preference relation 
on ℒ i.e. an individual ♀ cannot be more risk averse than an individual ♂. 
For any triple {x, y, z}⊂X such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z) we can construct a 
lottery L that yields an outcome x with a probability 1-q and an outcome z with a 
probability q∈(0,1). An expected utility maximizer ♂ prefers a degenerate lottery that 
yields outcome y for sure over lottery L if u♂(y) ≥ (1-q)u♂(x) + qu♂(z). We can rearrange 
this condition into 
(6) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
u y u x q
u z u y q
− ≥− −
♂ ♂
♂ ♂
. 
Similarly, an expected utility maximizer ♀ prefers a degenerate lottery that 
yields outcome y for sure over lottery L if 
(7) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
u y u x q
u z u y q
− ≥− −
♀ ♀
♀ ♀
. 
If the left-hand-side of (7) is strictly less than the left-hand-side of (6), then we can find 
a probability q∈(0,1) sufficiently close to one such that inequality (6) holds but 
inequality (7) does not hold. However, this contradicts to our premise that an individual 
♀ is more risk averse than an individual ♂ (we found a degenerate lottery and a risky 
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lottery L such that an individual ♂ prefers the degenerate lottery over L but an 
individual ♀ does not). Hence, the left-hand-side of (7) should be greater than or equal 
to the left-hand-side of (6) for any triple {x, y, z}⊂X such that u♀(x) < u♀(y) < u♀(z). 
Let us now prove that condition (2) is sufficient for characterizing an 
individual ♀ as more risk averse. An individual ♂ prefers a degenerate lottery that 
yields an outcome y ∈ X for sure over an arbitrary lottery L ∈ ℒ if 
(8) u♂(y) ≥ ∑x∈X L(x)u♂(x). 
If u♂(y) = maxx∈X  u♂(x) then condition (8) is satisfied for any lottery L. Since individuals 
♀ and ♂ have ordinally equivalent utility functions, it must be also the case that u♀(y) = 
maxx∈X u♀(x) so that u♀(y) ≥ ∑x∈X L(x)u♀(x). Thus, an individual ♀ also prefers a 
degenerate lottery that yields y for sure over any lottery L. 
If u♂(y) = minx∈X  u♂(x) then condition (8) can be satisfied only if lottery L 
yields the lowest possible expected utility u♂(y). Since individuals ♀ and ♂ have 
ordinally equivalent utility functions, it must be also the case that u♀(y) = minx∈X  u♀(x)= 
=∑x∈X L(x)u♀(x). Thus, in this case, if an individual ♂ weakly prefers a degenerate 
lottery that yields y for sure over lottery L, an individual ♀ does so as well. 
If u♂(y) ≠ maxx∈X  u♂(x) and u♂(y) ≠ minx∈X  u♂(x) then it is possible to find an 
outcome w ∈ X that has the highest utility u♂(w) such that u♂(w) < u♂(y). Similarly, it is 
possible to find an outcome z ∈ X that has the lowest utility u♂(z) so that u♂(z)>u♂(y). For 
convenience, let us introduce the following notation. For an arbitrary lottery L ∈ ℒ let 
q(w) denote the cumulative probability of all outcomes that have the utility of u♂(w), i.e. 
q(w) ≡ ∑x∈X| u♂(x)=u♂(w) L(x). Similarly, let us define q(y) ≡ ∑x∈X| u♂(x)=u♂(y) L(x) and q(z) ≡ 
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∑x∈X| u♂(x)=u♂(z) L(x). An individual ♂ prefers a degenerate lottery that yields an outcome 
y for sure over an arbitrary lottery L ∈ ℒ if  
(9) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
x X u x u w
x X u x u z
u y L x u x q w u w q y u y
q z u z L x u x
∈ <
∈ >
≥ + + +
+ +
∑
∑
♂ ♂
♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂
 
We can rearrange inequality (9) into the following condition 
(10) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
.
x X u x u w
x X u x u z
u y u w u w u x
q y L x
u z u w u z u w
u x u w
L x q z
u z u w
∈ <
∈ >
− −− + −− −
−− ≥−
∑
∑
♂ ♂
♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂
♂ ♂
 
If condition (2) holds then we have 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u w u x u w u x
u z u w u z u w
− −≥− −
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
 for any 
outcome x∈X such that u♂(x)<u♂(w). Condition (2) also implies that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u y u w u y u w
u z u w u z u w
− −≥− −
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
 and ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u x u w u x u w
u z u w u z u w
− −− ≥ −− −
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
 for any 
outcome x∈X such that u♂(x)>u♂(z). Using these results and inequality (10), we can write  
(11) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
.
x X u x u w
x X u x u z
u y u w u w u x
q y L x
u z u w u z u w
u x u w
L x q z
u z u w
∈ <
∈ >
− −− + −− −
−− ≥−
∑
∑
♂ ♂
♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀
♀ ♀
 
Finally, inequality (11) can be rewritten as u♀(y) ≥ ∑x∈X L(x)u♀(x). To sum up, 
if an individual ♂ prefers a degenerate lottery that yields an arbitrary outcome y for sure 
over an arbitrary lottery L and condition (2) holds, then an individual ♀ also prefers the 
degenerate lottery that yields outcome y for sure over lottery L. Thus, according to 
Definition 1, an individual ♀ is more risk averse than an individual ♂. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. 
Suppose that there is an individual ♀, characterized by utility function 
u♀:X→ and function ♀:→[0,1], who is more risk averse than another individual ♂, 
characterized by utility function u♂:X→ and function ♂:→[0,1]. First, let us prove 
that there is a constant k such that ♀(v) = ♂(kv) for all v ∈ .  
Let y ∈ X be an outcome such that u♂(y) = minx∈X u♂(x) and let z ∈ X be an 
outcome such that u♂(z) = maxx∈X u♂(x). Note that if u♂(y) = u♂(z) then an individual ♂ 
chooses with probabilities 50%-50% between any two lotteries (including degenerate 
lotteries). Since both individuals should have identical binary choice probabilities in 
choice under certainty, it follows that an individual ♀ also chooses with probabilities 
50%-50% between any two degenerate lotteries. This implies that function u♀:X→ 
maps all outcomes to just one number and individual ♀ also chooses with probabilities 
50%-50% between any two risky lotteries i.e. she cannot be more risk averse than an 
individual ♂. Therefore, we need only to consider the case when u♂(y) > u♂(z). 
Let us consider a degenerate lottery (y,1) that yields outcome y for sure and a 
risky lottery L that yields outcome y with probability 1-q and outcome z with probability 
q∈[0,1]. An individual ♂ chooses (y,1) over L with a probability ♂(-q(u♂(z)-u♂(y))). An 
individual ♀ chooses (y,1) over L with a probability ♀(-q(u♀(z)- u♀(y))). If an individual 
♀ is more risk averse than and individual ♂ we must have 
(12) ♀(-q(u♀(z)- u♀(y))) ≥ ♂(-q(u♂(z)-u♂(y))). 
Since ♀(-v) = 1 - ♀(v) and ♂(-v) = 1 - ♂(v) for any v ∈  we can rewrite (12) as  
(13) ♂(q(u♂(z)-u♂(y))) ≥ ♀(q(u♀(z)- u♀(y))). 
Let us consider a degenerate lottery (z,1) that yields outcome z for sure and a 
risky lottery L´ that yields outcome y with probability q and outcome z with probability 
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1-q. An individual ♂ chooses (z,1) over L´ with a probability ♂(q(u♂(z)-u♂(y))). An 
individual ♀ chooses (z,1) over L´ with a probability ♀(q(u♀(z)- u♀(y))). If an individual 
♀ is more risk averse than and individual ♂ we must have 
(14) ♀(q(u♀(z)- u♀(y))) ≥ ♂(q(u♂(z)-u♂(y))). 
Inequalities (13) and (14) can hold simultaneously only if  
(15) ♀(q(u♀(z)- u♀(y))) = ♂(q(u♂(z)-u♂(y))) 
for any q∈[0,1]. Using a substitution of variables q = v/(u♀(z)- u♀(y)) in equation (15) we 
arrive at ♀(v) = ♂(kv), were k = (u♂(z)-u♂(y))/(u♀(z)- u♀(y)) >0 is constant. 
Let us now prove that utility function u♀(.) is a positive linear transformation 
of utility function u♂(.) i.e. there are constants a>0 and b such that u♀(x) = au♂(x) + b for 
all x∈X. An individual ♂ chooses a degenerate lottery (x,1) over a degenerate lottery 
(y,1) with a probability ♂(u♂(x)-u♂(y)). An individual ♀ chooses (x,1)  over (y,1) with a 
probability ♀(u♀(x)- u♀(y)). If the two individuals can be ranked in terms of their risk 
preferences, we must have    
(16) ♀(u♀(x)- u♀(y)) = ♂(u♂(x)-u♂(y)). 
We already established that ♀(u♀(x)- u♀(y)) = ♂(k(u♀(x)- u♀(y))). Plugging this 
result into (16) we receive 
(17) ♂(k(u♀(x)- u♀(y))) = ♂(u♂(x)-u♂(y)). 
Since function ♂:→[0,1] is strictly increasing, equation (17) holds only if  
(18)  k(u♀(x)- u♀(y)) = u♂(x)-u♂(y). 
Rearranging (18) we obtain u♀(x) = u♂(x)/k + u♀(y) - u♂(y)/k i.e. utility function 
u♀(.) is a positive linear transformation of utility function u♂(.). Thus, individuals ♀ and 
♂ choose in an identical manner between any two lotteries. In other words, an 
individual ♀ cannot be more risk averse than an individual  ♂. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. 
Let U⊂ be the range (the image of the domain) of an utility function u:X→. 
Since the outcome set X is a finite nonempty set, U must be also a finite nonempty set of 
real numbers. Thus, we can number the elements of U so that ui<uj whenever i<j for any 
ui, uj ∈U and any i, j ∈ {1,…,|U|}. For any lottery S∈ℒ and any number ui∈U let Śi denote 
the cumulative probability of all outcomes that yield utility ui, i.e. Śi ≡ ∑x∈X| u(x)=ui S(x). 
Let us now consider an expected utility maximizer ♀ with utility function 
u♀:X→ who is more risk averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂ with ordinally 
equivalent utility function u♂:X→. An individual ♂ weakly prefers lottery S over 
lottery R if and only if ∑x∈X [S(x)-R(x)]u♂(x) ≥ 0, which is equivalent to: 
(19) 
1
0U ii ii Ś Ŕ u= ⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦∑ ♂ . 
Inequality (19) can be then rearranged into: 
(20) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 11 1 1 0k j U Uk j j j ji i i ij i j k i ju Ŕ Ś u u Ś Ŕ u u− + −= = = + =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − + − − ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑♂ ♂ ♂ ♂ ♂ , 
for any k∈{2,…,|U|-1}. Furthermore, we can rewrite inequality (20) as follows: 
(21) 
2 1 3 2
1
1 1 1 2 1 23 2 4 3 1
11
1 11 1 2
1 2
2 3
k
i ii
U Uk k
U U U U U Uk k U U
U U
iU U
u u u u
Ŕ Ś Ŕ Ŕ Ś Ś Ŕ Ś
u u u u
u u u u
Ś Ŕ Ś Ś Ŕ Ŕ
u u u u
u u
Ś
u u
−
=
−−
− −+ − −
− −
− −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + + + − ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎛ ⎞− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤× + − + + − − ×⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟⎜− −⎝ ⎠⎝
−× + + −−
∑… …
…
…
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂ ♂ ♂
♂ ♂
♂ ♂
11
 0.
k
U
i k ki k
u
Ŕ
u u+= +
⎞⎡ ⎤ + ≥⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎟ −⎠∑
♂
♂ ♂
 
According to Proposition 1, if an expected utility maximizer ♀ is more risk 
averse than an expected utility maximizer ♂ then we must have:  
(22) 
j i j i
m j m j
u u u u
u u u u
− −≥− −
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
♀ ♀ ♂ ♂
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for any i, j, m ∈ {1,…,|U|} such that i < j < m. Note that if there exists a number 
k∈{2,…,|U|-1} such that 
1
0j i ii Ŕ Ś= ⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦∑  for any j∈{1,…,k-1} and  0U i ii j Ś Ŕ= ⎡ ⎤− ≤⎣ ⎦∑  
for any j∈{k+1,…, |U|} then we can use inequality (22) to rewrite (21) as: 
(23) 
2 1 3 2
1
1 1 1 2 1 23 2 4 3 1
11
1 11 1 2
1 2
2 3
k
i ii
U Uk k
U U U U U Uk k U U
U U
iU U
u u u u
Ŕ Ś Ŕ Ŕ Ś Ś Ŕ Ś
u u u u
u u u u
Ś Ŕ Ś Ś Ŕ Ŕ
u u u u
u u
Ś
u u
−
=
−−
− −+ − −
− −
− −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + + + − ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎛ ⎞− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤× + − + + − − ×⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟⎜− −⎝ ⎠⎝
−× + + −−
∑… …
…
…
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀ ♀ ♀
♀ ♀
♀ ♀
11
 0.
k
U
i k ki k
u
Ŕ
u u+= +
⎞⎡ ⎤ + ≥⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎟ −⎠∑
♀
♀ ♀
 
Finally, we can rearrange (23) into 
1
0U ii ii Ś Ŕ u= ⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦∑ ♀ , which is equivalent to: 
(24) ∑x∈X [S(x)-R(x)] u♀(x) ≥ 0. 
To summarize, we showed that a more risk averse expected utility maximizer 
♀ weakly prefers lottery S over lottery R whenever a less risk averse expected utility 
maximizer ♂ weakly prefers S over R, if there exists a number k∈{2,…,|U|-1} such that 
1
0j i ii Ŕ Ś= ⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦∑  for any j∈{1,…,k-1} and 0U i ii j Ś Ŕ= ⎡ ⎤− ≤⎣ ⎦∑  for any j∈{k+1,…, |U|}.  
Note that if  0U i ii j Ś Ŕ= ⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦∑  for all j∈{k+1,…, |U|} then the left-hand side 
of (21) is strictly positive, i.e. we cannot find an individual ♂ who is exactly indifferent 
between S and R. In this case, according to Definition 2, S cannot be riskier than R. 
Therefore, we must have 0U i ii j Ś Ŕ= ⎡ ⎤− <⎣ ⎦∑  for at least one j∈{k+1,…, |U|}. By a 
similar argument, we must also have 
1
0j i ii Ŕ Ś= ⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦∑  for at least one j∈{1,…,k-1}.  
Hence, lottery R is riskier than lottery S if there exists an outcome y ∈ X such 
that ∑x∈X | u(x)≤v S(x) ≤ ∑x∈X | u(x)≤v R(x) for any v < u(y) and ∑x∈X | u(x)≤w S(x) ≥ ∑x∈X | u(x)≤w R(x) 
for any w > u(y) and there exists at least one v < u(y) and one w > u(y) such that both 
inequalities hold as strict inequalities. Q.E.D. 
